

Building democratic system in a multi ethnic society

Iraq :2003-2005

Democracy and Multi-Ethnic Society

The nature of ethnicity makes building democracy in multi-ethnic societies a complex process compared to other social affiliations such as economic class, political beliefs etc. We find people usually want and can change but with ethnicity, people usually don't want or cannot change. The same can be said with governments; a government can change economic and social condition but it cannot change ethnicity. The unique nature of ethnicity makes building democracy in a multi-ethnic society a very complex process¹. Nevertheless, to solve ethnicity problems, political thinkers have suggested four conditions which must be present in order to build a successful democratic political system in multi-ethnic societies. According to Lijphart², the conditions are:

1 - Power Sharing

Sharing of power by a grand coalition government which means giving all ethnic groups a role in the government or dividing the power proportionally among all the coalition partners. This can take many forms such as inclusive cabinet coalition of ethnic parties such as being practised in Malaysia, Austria and South Africa³. or by dividing the

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In 2003, The United States and its allies began its occupation of Iraq with the aim of establishing a democratic system in the country; they had a conviction that the Iraqi people could build a democratic system. In his speech at the Annual Dinner at the American Enterprise Institution, President Bush explained that conviction by saying that⁸:

There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq, with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom

However, the task of reconstruction and rebuilding Iraq into a democratic state has proven to be a very difficult process. The obstacles faced by the government are endless and it is the objective of this study to uncover the reasons for the failure to form a democratic government for the past seven years.

Historically, Iraq has been divided by two lines. The first line is the language. Arabic speaking Iraqis made up 75-80% of the population and Kurd speaking people, 15-20%. The second line is the division of its people by religious line- Shia and Sunni. In addition to the two big groups, there is the Turkish speaking Kurds, and religious minorities

power between the ethnic groups like Lebanon where the President is Christian, the Prime Minister is Sunni and Parliament speaker is Shia⁴.

2 - Cultural Autonomy “Federal System”:

Cultural autonomy can be conducted by a federal system like Switzerland and Belgium which give the ethnic groups the right to establish private school with full support from government and separate personal law for each ethnic or religious group⁵.

3 - Proportionality Representation

Political representation and civil service appointment means that each minority ethnic group has its special ratio in Parliament like in India where the Muslim minority has 12% of parliamentary seats and Sikh has 2% respectively⁶.

4 - Minority veto

Minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy: by this right, the minority ethnic group can protect their rights from majority domination like in India. In 1965, the central government gave non-Hindi majority states the right to refuse to use Hindi language as the official language⁷.

Iraq War 2003, The Democratic Aim

that have been a major stumbling block in building a democratic state in Iraq.

This research will follow the steps of building a democratic system in Iraq since the occupation. It will present information on what has been achieved on the way towards building an effective democratic system in Iraq.

The occupation period from April 2003 to June 2004

The authorities in Iraq during the occupation period from April 2003- to June 2004 consisted of two bodies which are the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

This Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established by the United States in May 2003 to be responsible for the security condition, economic recovery as well as the creation of a condition which could help the Iraqi people to establish a democratic system. A former American diplomat, Paul Bremer was chosen by President Bush to be the head of CPA¹¹.

From his position as the head of CPA, Paul Bremer who was a former counterinsurgency expert, immediately took some serious decisions which he thought was necessary to establish a democratic system in Iraq:

such as Christians, Yazidis and Sabians⁹. In 2003, after the removal of the Saddam Regime, the ethnicity problem became so serious and divisive because each ethnic group wanted to guarantee its position in the new Iraq¹⁰. However, ethnicity problem appeared after 2003 in three places or in three different points of view among various ethnic groups particularly among Shia on one side and Arab Sunni on the other.

Building Democracy process and Parties

There were three parties involved in building democracy in Iraq since 2003. They are: first, the Iraqi political powers. Second, the United States and its allies and third, the United Nations. All these parties are trying to address the problems and issues faced by Iraq as it transforms itself into a true democratic state.

It is clear that the main obstacle faced by Iraq since 2003 lies in its ethnic division. the international terrorists organizations as Al-Qaida use the sectarian division of Iraqi people in order to deepen its presence in Iraq and establish its own state as did in Afghanistan before , also the ethnic division open the door for regional player as Iran and Saudi Arabia to deepen its influence in Iraq . However , from the early days of The War months and years after 2003, Iraqi political powers and the United States with the help from the United Nations tried to solve the ethnic issue

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Guard, The Directorate of Military Intelligence, The Al Quds Force, and Emergency Forces.

Third Group involves the paramilitaries: Saddam Fedayeen, Ba`ath Party Militia, Friends of Saddam, Saddam's Lion Cubs.

Fourth Group includes other organizations such as : The Presidential Diwan, The Presidential Secretariat, The Revolutionary Command Council, The National Assembly, The Youth Organization, National Olympic Committee (it was led by Uday the oldest son of Saddam) , and Revolutionary, Special and National Security Courts

Iraqi Governing Council

According to United Nations Resolution 1483 which deals with Iraq during the occupation period- the Occupation Power has to establish an Iraqi governing body which would act as an interim administration. The Iraqi body has to work together with CPA until the establishment of a representative government elected by the Iraqi people. Bremer issued Regulation Number 13 in July 2003 which was the establishment of the Iraqi governing Council¹⁴.

The members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) were chosen by Bremer. IGC consists of 25 members. When choosing the members, Bremer took into account the ethnic division of Iraqi people and as a result, the formation of

First was the de Baathification of the Ba`ath Party: Bremer issued order number one 16-5-2003 which was the de Baathification or Disestablishment of the Ba`ath Party which aimed to remove the highest four levels members in the organization - Regional Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member, Group Member. The members should be removed and forbidden from seeking employment in public sector. This action was taken because of the probable threat which could come by Baath high ranking members in case they continued to serve in the Iraqi government. Their continued presence meant that they could establish Baathists network inside the government body which could work to destroy the government from inside¹².

The second was to dissolve some specific entities: the entities were those set up under Saddam which had a role in abusing the Iraqi people. The entities involved four groups¹³: First Group covers several ministries: The Ministry of Defence, The Ministry of Information, The Ministry of State for Military Affairs, The Iraqi Intelligence Service, The National Security Bureau, The Directorate of National Security and The Special Security.

The Second Group involves the military organizations: The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other regular military services, as The Republican Guard, The Special Republican

Islamism, secularists, nationalists and communist. There was no one leader for the governing council but it adopted monthly leadership among nine of its members. And to deal with deadly life IGC chose 25 ministries¹⁵.

the Governing Council was done according to ethnicity: 13(50%) members were Arab Shia, 5 (20%) ,Arab Sunni , 5(20%) Kurds,1, Turkmen and 1, Assyrian. The political division also was taken into account by Bremer so the Governing Council covered a spectrum of political views such as

1	WAEEL ABDUL-LATIF	Independent	Shia
2	* IYAD ALAWI	The Iraqi National Accord\ Secularist	Shia
3	AHMED AL-BARAK ALBU-SULTAN	Independent	Shia
4	* AHMED CHALABI	Iraqi National Congress	Shia
5	* ABDUL-AZIZ AL-HAKIM	The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq	Shia
6	AQILA AL-HASHIMI	Independent	Shia
7	* IBRAHIM AL-JAAFARI	Al-Dawa Party leader	Shia
8	RAJA HABIB AL-KHUZAI	Independent	Shia
9	ABDUL-KARIM MAHMOUD	Leader, Marsh Arab guerrilla war against Saddam	Shia
10	HAMID MAJID MOUSSA	Communist Party leader	Shia
11	MUWAFFAK AL-RABIA	Independent	Shia
12	IZZEDDIN SALIM	Islamist / Shia	Shia
13	* MUHAMMAD BAHR AL-ULOUM	Independent /Moderate Cleric	Shia
14	*ADNAN PACHACHI	Former Foreign Minister/ Independent Democratic Movement	Sunni
15	*MUHSIN ABDUL-HAMID	Iraqi Islamic Party	Sunni
16	NASIR CHADERCHI	National Democratic Party	Sunni
17	SAMIR SHAKIR MAHMOUD	Independent	Sunni
18	GHAZI MASHAL AJIL AL-YAWER	Tribal Chief	Sunni
19	SALAHEDDINE BAHAEDDIN	Kurdistan Islamic Union	Kurd
20	* MASSOUD BARZAN	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Kurd
21	DARA NOOR AL-DIN	Independent	Kurd
22	MAHMOUD ALI OTHMAN	Independent	Kurd
23	* JALAL TALABANI	leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,	Kurd
24	SONDUL CHAPOUK	independent,	Turkoman
25	YOUNADEM YUSUF KANA	Democratic Assyrian Movement	Assyrian Christian

Table 1 Names of Iraqi Governing Council Members (source The Iraqi Governing Council,” *Social Education* 68, no. 1 , 2004.)

* mean presidential member

prepared their own vision of TAL. Kurdish draft was written with emphases on their perception about the Iraq and federal issues. The second draft was written by the liberal democrat IGC members led by Sunni Arab, Adnan Pachachi. The different points of views presented by the three blocs in IGC-Shia, Sunni and Kurd, resulted in interference by the CPA which decided to impose its own draft of TAL which was written by two Iraqis namely, Salem Chalabi and Faisal Isterabadi¹⁷. However, the final draft imposed by CPA particularly Clause 61 C, created problem among the IGC members. That clause put condition on the approval of the coming permanent constitution – supposed to be written in October 2005- that condition states that the constitution be approved by general referendum if it accepted by majority voters and not rejected by two to three of voters in any three Iraqi provinces. This condition served Kurdish interest because they control three provinces in the Kurdistan territory. From the Shia point of view, that condition gave the minority the ability to control the country's future¹⁸.

The other opposition to the TAL came from Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani. His opposition to TAL was because it was written under the occupation influence^{19*} and it restricted the national assembly –which was to be elected in

Steps Toward Democratic Iraq

There were many steps taken by CPA and IGC which aimed to end the occupation status and start building a new system.

The November 15 2003 Agreement

The process of building a democratic system in Iraq was started in November 2003 when both CPA and IGC signed the “15th of November Agreement”. That agreement put in place a timetable to end the occupation status and transfer sovereignty to Iraqi people which was supposed to be done by 30th June 2004. And in order to administrate Iraq during the transitional period – the transfer of the sovereignty to Iraqi people on 30 of June 2004 to establish the government based on the permanent constitution December 2005- the CPA and IGC agreed in the 15th of November Agreement to write a transitional administration law by February 2004 and it had to enter power on 30th of June the same year¹⁶.

Transitional Administration Law (TAL)

According to the 15th of November Agreement, CPA and IGC have to write the TAL to be the temporary constitution. The different point of view of the IGC members was reflected on their opinion about the TAL; both Kurdish and Sunni members

The Interim Government from June 2004 – January 2005

The interim government is the government which had taken the responsibility of Iraq from CPA on 30th of June 2004. The main purpose of the Interim Government was preparing Iraq for national assembly election in January 2005. There were triple negotiations during formation of the interim government. The first part was by IGC, the second part was by CPA and third part was by United Nations special envoys to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi²³.

During his negotiation with IGC, Brahimi supported the establishment of a technocrat government from within 12-15 ministries to prepare Iraq for the national assembly election. He also suggested that security of the country had to be managed by the National Security council consisted of the leaders of the National Parties as well as the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior. However, the CPA didn't support the idea of the formation of a technocrat government instead it supported a full cabinet government to take control of the country. The insurgency which broke out in Najaf and Fallujah in April 2004 during the negotiation for the formation the Interim Government outweighed CPA's opinion about full cabinet government. Moreover, the security situation during the period from April 2004

January 2005 - to write the constitution because of the *Clause 61 C*. The Ayatollah sent a letter to the United Nation Security Council warning it to give the TAL an international legitimization by mentioning to it in resolution 1546 (the resolution which end occupation status)²⁰. United Nations Security Council took into account Ayatollah Sistani letter's and didn't mention to TAL in its resolution 1546.

Regardless of the oppositions or the different point of view about TAL and the building democracy in Iraq, TAL tried to solve the one main problem faced in building democracy in Iraq which was minority as follow:

First, the Kurd issue: all the institutions of Kurdistan territory which was established after 1991 when Kurd was granted their de facto independent territory, would be recognized by TAL as a part from federal Iraq²¹.

Second, the language issue: TAL considered both Arabic and Kurdish as formal languages in Iraq. By this, Arabic and Kurdish languages are allowed to be used in Parliament and cabinet meeting, on the currency, formal newspapers and international passport. In addition to Arabic and Kurdish, the minorities groups such as Turkmen, Syriac, or Armenian have the right to learn their own languages in their in general school according to educational regulations²².

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became a full sovereign state. The name of the occupation force was changed to be multinational force²⁶

The formation of the interim government comes within the sharing power criteria, where all ethnic groups were represented. The senior positions were divided among Shia, Sunni and Kurd while the small minorities were also given some positions. This distribution of power is a good sign that the new Iraq is not established along ethnic groups but it is established on sharing power base:

supported Iyad Allawi, a secular Shia member with security mindset of IGC to be chosen by Brahimi and IGC to be the Interim Prime Minister²⁴.

The final decision for the formation of the Interim Government came from CPA. In June 2004 Paul Bremer issued Regulation Number 10 to transfer the sovereignty of Iraq from CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government²⁵. And In June 2004 the United Nations Security Council issued resolution number 1546. That resolution endorses the end of the occupation and dissolve the CPA and Iraq

	Position	Name	Ethnicity
1	President	Ghazi al Yawer	Arab Sunni
2	Vice president	Ibrahim Jaafari	Arab Shia
3	Vice president	Rowsh Shaways	Kurd
4	Prime Minister	Iyad Allawi	Arab Shia
5	Deputy Prime Minister	Barham Salih	Kurd

Table 2 Distribution of the senior positions in the Interim Government (source: CPA Regulation Number 10 http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG_10_Members_of_Designated_Iraqi_Interim_Government_with_Annex_A.pdf>).




Figure 1 Distribution of Interim Government seats (source: CPA Regulation Number 10 http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG_10_Members_of_Designated_Iraqi_Interim_Government_with_Annex_A.pdf).

Iraq that the election was illegal because it was held while Iraq was under occupation. As a result of the boycott of the Arab Sunni community, the result of the election saw the domination of Shia dominated parties winning the election – the United Iraqi Ally won 51% of the seats followed by the Kurd Kurdish Alliance (27%) , secularists Iraqi National (15%) , and others, 7% .28.

Permanent Constitution

Writing a permanent constitution is an important step toward building a democracy in Iraq. Due to the importance of the constitution for the future of Iraqi people, all Iraqi ethnic groups were eager to participate in writing the constitution in order to guarantee their future.

Even the Sunnis who decided to boycott

National Assembly Election 2005

The first general election was held in January 2005 to elect the national assembly members for writing a permanent constitution for the first time in Iraq since 1958. In addition, the national assembly had to elect a transnational government.

The election has been held by wide participation from the Shia and Kurd communities. The Sunni community didn't participate in the election. They boycotted the election due to two reasons. First, they considered the security situation in their provinces was not suitable for election and they demanded a delay in the election and this argument was adopted by the Iraqi Islamic Party²⁷ . The other argument was adopted based on the Association of Muslim Scholars' perspective in

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September 2005 and the general Referendum was held in October 2005 and the final result was the acceptance of the constitution by the majority of Iraqi people and was not rejected by 2/3 of voters in any of the three provinces³².

The Constitutional Framework

The Permanent Constitution of Iraq recognizes one important fact that should be considered to establish a democratic Iraq. This fact is the ethnicity of Iraq. And to solve this problem the constitution determined Iraq as a federal state:

The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.³³

Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects³⁴.

Considering Iraq as federal state as in Article One, and as multiethnic country as in Article Three of Iraqi constitution requires a constitutional framework to deal with it.

Federalism

Historically Iraq was divided into several states whether during the Islamic State era, or during the Ottoman Empire. The Central Government System was created by Britain after 1921 and it resulted

General Assembly Election decided to participate in writing the permanent constitution. Both the Iraqi Islamic party and the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq which represented the religious decision for Iraqi Sunnis refrained from boycotting the election and participated in writing the constitution²⁹. This willingness of participation by Arab Sunni was due to the low representation of the community in the National Assembly. The initial constitution committee consisted of 55 members and the majority of them were Arab Shia and Kurd with only two Arab Sunni members. The low representation of Sunni members can threatened the constitution in two ways; first, the constitution will not be legitimate if one of the main ethnic groups in Iraq- the Arab Sunni did not participate in it and the second is that the constitution probably would fail in the general referendum because of the condition of Clause 61 C of TAL which considered the permanent constitution to fail if it was rejected by 2\3 of the voters in any three provinces³⁰. Therefore, to solve the problem, both the Shia religious leadership, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the United States called for the participation of share Arab Sunni in the Constitution Committee. As a result, 25 new Arab Sunni Members were added to the Constitution Committee. 15 of them had voting rights while the other 10 members had only consolation position³¹. The constitution committee finished it work within the deadline-

- E. Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality such as bank notes, passports, and stamps.

The other small minority groups as Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian also have the right to use its language as an official language in areas where they constitute the majority of the population. In addition, the right of the small minority groups to educate their children in their mother tongue language is guaranteed by the government (article 4)

Sharing Power

The power sharing in Iraq is based on two points.

The first constitution base: this point linked with the selection of the cabinet:

1. First step: the newly elected parliament members in their first meeting have to choose the speaker of the parliament.
2. Second step: the parliament has to choose the speaker by 2/3 majority of parliament members. Given the ethnicity nature of Iraqi political parties, it seem impossible for any sect in Iraq whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd to gain 2\3 majority in the parliament so this constitutional condition imposes on Iraqi parties to make a coalition among them to get the majority of 2\3 to elect the President who will then choose the Prime Minister from the biggest parliament members.

in continued ethnic fighting between the Shia in the South and Kurd in the north. Therefore, there was wish by people and political elite to return to states or federal system to get rid of the central government system and its problem³⁵. As a result, the Iraqi Constitution allowed the establishment of a federal territory and gives the regional government supreme authority over federal government. However, the management of Natural Resources and National Defense will continue to be under the federal government.

Languages issues

Iraqi constitution determines that both Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages for the Republic of Iraq. The official language means that both languages can be used in:

- A. Publication of the Official Gazette, in the two languages;
- B. Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as the Council of Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages;
- C. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two languages;
- D. Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with the educational guidelines;

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We are going to respect the choice of those who voted and we will consider the new government - if all the parties participating in the political process agree on it - as a transitional government with limited powers³⁷.

The sharing of power among Iraqi political parties was not based on one specific quota or the division of the senior positions among the ethnic groups but it was based on the election results and the participation of the three major ethnic groups - Shia, Sunni and Kurd. This distribution which was based only on the election result can guarantee two things. The first one is sharing of power and the second is to guarantee and protect voters' choice.

The following tables and figures will present the sharing of power among Iraqi ethnic groups based on election results:

Power Sharing during the Transitional Government - April 2005- January 2006

According to the Transitional Administrative Law, the Transitional Government has to be formed before the National Assembly Election in order to prepare Iraq for a parliamentary election based on the new permanent constitution. The distribution of Senior Positions of the transnational government was also based on ethnicity.

The more important point from the constitution condition which is explained above is the reorganization of Iraqi political power to the importance of sharing power among all ethnic groups and minorities to establish an effective democracy in Iraq during the negotiation of the formation of the second transitional government in 2005. During the first full term of government, the emphasis by Iraqi political leaders was the sharing of power among all ethnic groups.

In his statement about the formation of the transitional government, Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of Iraqi National Allies (Shia coalition) who gained about 50% of the national assembly seats, he emphasized on power sharing and rejected the idea of control by Shia of the government. He said³⁶:

Our group [United Iraqi Alliance] believes in sharing power with all Iraqi factions. We have rejected the idea of a sectarian regime, and we believe that Iraq is for all Iraqis

Although the Association of Muslim scholars in Iraq adopted a hard-line position toward the election and called to boycott it, they however, welcome the transitional government if it reflected power sharing and came with the participation of all parties:




Figure 2 Distribution of National Assembly Seats (source: Independent high electoral commission from: <<http://www.ihec-iq.com/ftpar/election2004/other/name2.pdf>>




Figure 3 Distribution of Transitional Government (source: Transitional Iraqi government, Ashaq Alawsat [the Middle East] number 9649, April 29 2005

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	Position	Name	Ethnicity
1	President	Jalal al- Talibani	Kurd
2	Vice President	Adel Abdul Mahdi	Shia
3	Vice President	Ghazi al Yawer	Sunni
4	Prime Minister	Ibrahim Jaafari	Shia
5	Deputy Prime Minister	Rowsch Shaways	Kurd
6	Deputy Prime Minister	Abd Metalq al-Jubouri	Sunni
7	Deputy Prime Minister	Ahmed al-Chalabi	Shia
8	Parliament Speaker	Hachim al-Hasanies	Sunni
9	Deputy Parliament Speaker	Hussain al-Shahristani	Shia
10	Deputy Parliament Speaker	Arif Tayfur	Kurd

Table 3 Transitional Government (Senior Position) (source: *Ashaq Alawsat [the Middle East]*, number 9624, 4 ,April 2005, number, 9628, 8 April 2005& number 9649, April 29 2005

participation of Arab Sunni. They prefer to participate to gain political power rather than depend on insurgency. However, the election resulted in the Shia winning the biggest number of seats inside the parliament. The distribution of parliament seats is shown below:

Sharing of Power - First Full Term Government from May 2005 to December 2010

The first parliamentary election was held in December 2005. It was based on the permanent constitution; this election is different from the national assembly election in terms of the




Figure 4 Distributions of First Parliament Seats (source: Independent high electoral commission http://www.iheci.com/ftpar/regulation2005/other/The_names_of_the_members_of_the_House_of_Representatives_ar.pdf).




Figure 5 Distribution of Ethnic Group -First Full Term Government (Source: *Ashaq Alawsat [the Middle East]*, number 10036, 21 May 2006).

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	Position	Name	Ethnicity
1	President	Jalal al- Talibani	Kurd
2	Vice President	Adel Abdul Mahdi	Shia
3	Vice President	Tariq al-Hashimi	Sunni
4	Prime Minister	Nuri al-Maliki	Shia
5	Deputy Prime Minister	Barham Salih	Kurd
6	Deputy Prime Minister	Salam Al Zobaie	Sunni
7	Parliament Speaker	Mahmoud al-Mashhadani	Sunni
8	Deputy Parliament Speaker	Khalid al-Attiyah	Shia
9	Deputy Parliament Speaker	Arif Tayfur	Kurd

Table 4 The Distribution of senior position in the First Full Term Government (Source: *Ashaq Alawsat [the Middle East]*, number 10008, 23 April 2006 <http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=10008&article=359560> and number 10036, 21 May 2006. <<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=364201&issueno=10036>>).

and first Parliament as well as total Cabinets Seats which include: Interim, Transnational and First Permanent Government.

Total Sharing of Power

Figure 6 shows the total distribution of power in Parliaments Seats which include National assembly




Figure 6 Total number of Parliament Seats (Source: collected from Figure 3 and Figure 5).




Figure 7 Total Distribution of Iraqi Cabinets (2004-2010). (collected from Figure 2, Figure4 and Figure 6).

Iraqi ethnic groups and not based on domination by one ethnic group. The other important point was the “*Cultural Autonomy*” which allows the use of Arabic and Kurdish as formal languages by the Iraqi Constitution. It goes further by allowing all minorities to use their mother tongue in education and even as formal language in some cases.

These two points prove to be important in building a successful Democratic System in Iraq even though the country did not have any experience with this new political situation. Nevertheless, it has placed Iraq on the right track toward building a democratic state.

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By looking at Total Distribution of Power (figure 8), it shows that the Arab Shia gain 49% percent of Parliament Seats and got 53% of Cabinets Seats, the Kurds gained 20% of Parliaments Seats and 20% of Cabinets Seats, the Arab Sunni gain 10% of Parliaments Seats and gain 19% of Cabinets Seats. The Iraqi National List “secularists” gained 12% of Parliament Seats and gained 5% of Cabinet Seats.

Conclusion

The Constitutional Framework and sharing of power which formed the basis of democratic progress in Iraq since 2003 addressed an important point which was the reality of Iraqi political power to deal with the ethnic problems. The political power didn't ignore the issue of ethnicity in Iraq as it was ignored before 2003. The new system which is based on sharing of power among all

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